AML by design: Designing a central bank digital currency to stifle money laundering

Robert Mahari, Thomas Hardjono, Alex Pentland2022 · DOI

Abstract

This article explores how technical central bank digital currency (CBDC) design choices can be used to make a CBDC inherently resistant to money laundering. These design choices not only further anti-money laundering (AML), but they can also help to better balance AML priorities with other goals including financial inclusion, privacy and compliance costs. Moreover, CBDCs provide an opportunity to measure the effectiveness of different design choices in real time. These measurements can facilitate the iterative redesign of CBDCs to identify optimal approaches to meeting regulatory objectives.

Introduction

The advent of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) represents a "once-in-a-century" opportunity to bake anti-money laundering (AML) protections directly into the technical architecture of money. Currently, the global AML regime is a massive, inefficient engine. The private sector spends over $200 billion annually on compliance, yet the system often fails to catch sophisticated criminals while simultaneously "de-risking"—or excluding—legitimate users in low-income communities.

Traditional money is "dumb"—it is a passive asset requiring layers of manual reporting, such as Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs), to monitor. In contrast, CBDCs are programmable. The challenge lies in designing this new digital plumbing to stifle money laundering without creating an intrusive surveillance state or a system so cumbersome that it discourages adoption.

The "AML by Design" Framework

The proposed framework for "AML by Design" focuses on three technical pillars:

  1. Interoperable Digital Identity: Instead of every bank performing redundant Customer Due Diligence (CDD), a system of "portable credentials" can be implemented. A trusted third-party intermediary performs the check once and issues a digital token that the user can use to open accounts across the network, reducing the attack surface for data breaches.
  2. Collaborative Algorithmic Monitoring: Currently, banks only see their own "slice" of the transaction network, making it easy for criminals to hide "tumbler" schemes across multiple institutions. By using smart contracts to analyze pseudonymized transaction data across the entire network, suspicious patterns can be identified without revealing raw personal data unless specific legal thresholds are met.
  3. Data Trusts for Record Keeping: To balance law enforcement needs with consumer privacy, transaction records can be stored in "data trusts." These entities would have a fiduciary duty to protect user data, requiring digital search warrants for law enforcement to de-anonymize specific transactions.

Holistic Network Analysis

A key advantage of a CBDC is the ability to view the transaction graph holistically. While individual commercial banks may only see isolated transactions, a centralized or federated CBDC system can identify complex "mixers" or "tumblers" used to obscure the origin of funds.

Figure 1: A holistic view of a transaction network allows for the detection of suspicious clusters or "tumblers" that are invisible to individual institutions.

Key Insights and Policy Implications

The authors argue that privacy and AML are not a zero-sum game. Through pseudonymization and "data minimization"—sharing only what is strictly necessary for a specific check—a CBDC can be more private than a traditional bank account while remaining more transparent to investigators.

Furthermore, CBDCs enable "Iterative Legal Design." Because they generate real-time data, regulators can treat policy like software. They can measure the efficacy of a specific AML rule, observe if it causes unintended "de-risking," and tweak the "code" of the regulation iteratively to find optimal balances.

Expected Outcomes

A well-designed CBDC promises several qualitative improvements:

  • Reduced Compliance Costs: Automating CDD and STR reporting could significantly lower the global spend on financial crime compliance.
  • Enhanced Financial Inclusion: By decoupling identity verification from bank profit motives, "high-risk" but legitimate individuals are less likely to be arbitrarily excluded.
  • Evidence-Based Policy: Regulators can move from "process-based" compliance (checking boxes) to "outcome-based" compliance (actually stopping crime).

Limitations and Challenges

Despite the potential, several hurdles remain. There is an "Adoption Trap": if a CBDC is too restrictive, users may stick to cash or move to unregulated cryptocurrencies. Additionally, the "Weakest Link" problem suggests that if a CBDC coexists with less-regulated money, criminals will simply shift illicit funds through those channels. Finally, international interoperability and the security of "data trusts" remain significant technical and diplomatic challenges that must be addressed for a global impact.

Summary updated

Abstract

This article explores how technical central bank digital currency (CBDC) design choices can be used to make a CBDC inherently resistant to money laundering. These design choices not only further anti-money laundering (AML), but they can also help to better balance AML priorities with other goals including financial inclusion, privacy and compliance costs. Moreover, CBDCs provide an opportunity to measure the effectiveness of different design choices in real time. These measurements can facilitate the iterative redesign of CBDCs to identify optimal approaches to meeting regulatory objectives.
BibTeX
@misc{mahari2022aml,
  author = {Robert Mahari and Thomas Hardjono and Alex Pentland},
  title = {{AML by design: Designing a central bank digital currency to stifle money laundering}},
  year = {2022},
  doi = {10.38105/spr.j0hildxtyi},
}
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