Advancing Fair Division in Overseas Farmland Investment via Shapley Value

Yang Chuan, Meng Du, Xinhai LuLand 2025 · DOI

TL;DR

Overseas farmland investment (OFI) is crucial for global food security but often faces challenges in fairly distributing its benefits. This paper proposes using the Shapley value, a cooperative game theory concept, to create a more equitable profit-sharing mechanism between host countries and investing nations, thereby incentivizing collaboration and boosting rural development.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

The world faces a growing hunger and malnutrition crisis, exacerbated by a rising global population and the need for increased food production. Overseas farmland investment (OFI) is seen as a potential solution, enabling countries with capital to invest in agricultural land in other nations to enhance food security and promote economic development. However, OFI is often criticized as "land grabbing," with concerns about the fair distribution of profits and benefits between the investing countries and the host nations, particularly regarding the impact on local populations and ecosystems. This paper addresses the critical challenge of ensuring a "fair division" of the economic gains generated by OFI, aiming to move beyond a win-lose scenario to one where all parties benefit equitably, thus fostering more sustainable and cooperative international agricultural ventures.

Methods

The authors employ a cooperative game theory framework to model overseas farmland investment. Specifically, they utilize the Shapley value, a well-established method for fairly distributing the total gains generated by a coalition among its members. The core idea is to calculate each participant's marginal contribution to the overall profit and allocate benefits proportionally.

The methodology involves:

  1. Defining players: In this case, the players are the participating countries (e.g., China as an investor, and Vietnam and Laos as host countries).
  2. Defining coalitions: Different combinations of players forming alliances (e.g., China investing alone, China and Vietnam cooperating, or all three cooperating).
  3. Calculating the characteristic function (v(S)): This represents the total benefit (farmland benefit value) a coalition S can generate. The farmland benefit value is calculated as Total area × Production level.
  4. Applying the Shapley value formula: This formula systematically calculates the average marginal contribution of each player across all possible coalition formations, ensuring a fair distribution of the total gains.

The paper contrasts this with non-cooperative scenarios where players act independently. The Shapley value is presented as a novel application to OFI to address the fair division problem, moving beyond existing research that primarily focuses on land value.

Datasets

The study uses publicly available data for its case study:

  • Agricultural productivity data: Sourced from the World Bank, covering the average production (tons/hm²) for China, Vietnam, and Laos from 2009 to 2022.
  • Farmland investment data: Obtained from the Land Matrix Database, providing the target area (hm²) of farmland invested in by overseas investors.

The case study focuses on a three-player game involving China (as the investor), Vietnam, and Laos (as host countries) in Southeast Asia.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • OFI as a Cooperative Game: Framing OFI as a cooperative game highlights the potential for mutual benefit and incentivizes collaboration, moving away from adversarial "land grab" narratives.
  • Shapley Value for Equitable Distribution: The Shapley value provides a mathematically sound and fair method to allocate profits, ensuring that each participant receives a share proportional to their marginal contribution. This can overcome the "fair division" barrier in OFI.
  • Incentivizing Collaboration: By demonstrating that cooperation can lead to greater overall benefits than independent action, the Shapley value can motivate countries to engage in OFI partnerships.
  • Beyond Economic Gains: While the study focuses on economic benefits, the authors acknowledge the importance of considering ecological and social aspects for truly sustainable OFI.
  • Technological Disparity as a Driver: Differences in technology between investing and host countries can be a significant factor in driving the benefits of cooperation, as technology transfer can boost productivity.

Key Results

The study's case study with China, Vietnam, and Laos demonstrates the application of the Shapley value. The calculations show that:

  • Grand Coalition Benefits: The grand coalition (all three countries cooperating) generates the highest total farmland benefit value (6.6 x 10⁹).
  • Shapley Value Allocation: The Shapley value calculation provides a specific distribution of these benefits among the three players. For instance, the calculated Shapley values are:
  • Player 1 (China): 1.9 x 10⁶
    • Player 2 (Vietnam): 2.1 x 10⁶
    • Player 3 (Laos): 2.6 x 10⁶
  • Core Condition Fulfillment: The calculated Shapley values fall within the "core" of the game, meaning they satisfy the conditions for individual rationality and Pareto efficiency, ensuring that no player has an incentive to leave the coalition. This indicates the feasibility and fairness of the proposed allocation.
  • Fairness and Incentives: The Shapley allocation guarantees each player at least the same benefits as they would receive in a non-cooperative scenario, thus providing a strong incentive for cooperation. The extra benefits from cooperation are divided fairly.

Limitations and Future Work

The authors acknowledge several limitations and suggest avenues for future research:

  • Simplification of Global Dynamics: The model simplifies complex geopolitical and economic relationships between countries, relying on reasonable economic assumptions. Future work could incorporate more empirical data and complex network analyses.
  • Limited Data: The case study used data from only three countries due to data availability. Future research should incorporate empirical evidence from ongoing cooperative practices involving more countries.
  • Ignoring Transaction Costs: The model does not explicitly account for the costs associated with bargaining and negotiation among stakeholders, which can be significant in real-world OFI.
  • Focus on Economic Benefits: The study primarily focuses on economic benefits (farmland benefit value). Future research should integrate environmental governance costs and the "negative costs" borne by local populations (e.g., ecological degradation, social conflicts).
  • Broader Stakeholder Inclusion: The model could be expanded to include a wider range of stakeholders, such as local farmers, indigenous communities, and non-governmental organizations, to ensure a more holistic approach to fair division.
  • Institutional Framework: The paper emphasizes the need for an appropriate institutional setting for fair division to be practically implemented. Future work could explore the design of such frameworks and unified standards for OFI.

Summary updated

Abstract

Currently, a global hunger and malnutrition crisis is spreading throughout various regions worldwide. Overseas farmland investment endeavors to enhance regional food production through international cooperation but faces the challenge of ensuring a fair division. Our study develops a more equitable method: we have modeled overseas farmland investment as a cooperative game, reallocating benefits among host countries and investing countries. The application of our results to real data indicates that there is not only significant scope for improvement for host countries and overseas investors—which gain added benefits—but also a remarkable contribution made to rural development in terms of increased productivity. The cooperation to increase farmland yield through technology and capital transfer can be achieved in practice. In this context, transnational cooperations can provide additional benefits to participants, which can offer an important motivation for collaborators.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{chuan2025advancing,
  author = {Yang Chuan and Meng Du and Xinhai Lu},
  title = {{Advancing Fair Division in Overseas Farmland Investment via Shapley Value}},
  booktitle = {Land},
  year = {2025},
  doi = {10.3390/land14040767},
}
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