A unified theory of counterfactual reasoning

Christopher G. Lucas, Charles KempeScholarship 2018 · DOI

Abstract

A successful theory of causal reasoning should be able to account for inferences about counterfactual scenarios. Pearl (2000) has developed a formal account of causal reasoning that has been highly influential but that suffers from at least two limitations as an account of counterfactual reasoning: it does not distinguish between counterfactual observations and counterfactual interventions, and it does not accommodate back- tracking counterfactuals. We present an extension of Pearl’s account that overcomes both limitations. Our model provides a unified treatment of counterfactual interventions and back- tracking counterfactuals, and we show that it accounts for data collected by Sloman and Lagnado (2005) and Rips (2010).
BibTeX
@inproceedings{lucas2018unified,
  author = {Christopher G. Lucas and Charles Kemp},
  title = {{A unified theory of counterfactual reasoning}},
  booktitle = {eScholarship},
  year = {2018},
  doi = {10.1184/r1/6613274},
}

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