A two-sided logistics matching method considering trading psychology and matching effort under a 4PL

Na Yuan, Haiming Liang, Min Huang, Qing WangInternational Journal of Industrial Engineering Computations 2023 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper introduces a novel two-sided matching model for Fourth-Party Logistics (4PL) providers that moves beyond static preferences by incorporating "trading psychology" and "matching effort." By accounting for participant urgency and the effort spent on information gathering, the model maximizes the probability of successful, stable, and fair partnerships between customers and service providers.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

In the modern supply chain, a 4PL acts as a "broker of brokers." Unlike traditional logistics companies, a 4PL usually owns no trucks or warehouses; instead, it integrates the resources of Third-Party Logistics (3PL) providers to meet customer demands.

The core challenge for a 4PL is matching: connecting the right customer with the right 3PL. Traditional matching algorithms (like the classic Gale-Shapley "stable marriage" algorithm) often fall short in this context because they assume participants have fixed, perfect knowledge of their preferences. In reality:

  1. Psychology varies: A customer with an urgent shipment (eager) has different stability requirements than one planning a year in advance (patient).
  2. Information is earned: The "value" of a partner isn't always obvious. Participants must exert "matching effort" to uncover a partner's true capabilities versus the "public value" advertised by the 4PL.
  3. The Broker is active: The 4PL often "packages" information to make matches more attractive, creating a gap between public and real values.

Methods

The authors propose a bi-objective 0-1 programming model that redefines matching stability through the lens of behavioral science. Key components include:

  • Trading Psychology Categorization: Participants are classified as Eager, Neutral, or Patient. This determines their "waiting cost"—how much they are willing to risk losing a current match for a potentially better one.
  • Matching Effort Quantification: The model introduces an effort variable ($w$). If a participant puts in zero effort, they only see the 4PL’s "public value." High effort allows them to see the "real value" of the other party.
  • Redefined Stability: The authors redefine the concept of a "blocking pair" (a pair that would rather match with each other than their current partners). In this model, a pair only "blocks" if the perceived gain outweighs the psychological waiting cost.
  • Fairness Thresholds: To ensure long-term cooperation, the model uses a fairness threshold ($\epsilon$). If the value gap between two matched parties is too large, the "under-compensated" party is likely to abandon the deal, lowering the "trading possibility."
  • Bi-objective Optimization: The model simultaneously maximizes the total trading possibilities for both the customer side and the 3PL side.

Datasets

The paper evaluates the model using a numerical example rather than a massive real-world dataset.

  • Scope: 7 customers ($A_1–A_7$) and 8 3PL providers ($B_1–B_8$).
  • Parameters: The authors assigned specific real values, public values, effort levels, and psychological types to these 15 entities to demonstrate how the algorithm navigates complex, conflicting demands.
  • Comparison: The results were compared against eight existing matching methods (e.g., Azevedo 2014, Liang et al. 2020) to highlight the unique advantages of considering behavioral factors.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • The "Aha" Moment on Stability: Traditional models say a match is unstable if a better option exists. This paper argues that urgency overrides optimality. An "eager" customer might accept a sub-optimal match because the "cost of waiting" for a better 3PL is infinitely high.
  • Information Asymmetry as a Choice: By modeling "matching effort," the authors acknowledge that information gathering has a cost. The evaluation value of a partner is a weighted average of what the broker says and what the participant discovers through their own due diligence.
  • Broker Influence: The paper explicitly models the 4PL's role in "inflating" public values to facilitate market liquidity, a realistic touch often ignored in purely mathematical matching theory.

Key Results

  • Feasibility: The model successfully produced an optimal matching scheme for the 7x8 test case, identifying seven specific pairs that maximized mutual trading probability.
  • Superiority in Realism: Compared to existing methods, this model was the only one to simultaneously account for matching effort, waiting costs, fairness, and psychology.
  • Mathematical Proofs: The authors proved several theorems, including one showing that their model "degenerates" (simplifies) into classical stability models under specific conditions (e.g., when everyone is "patient" and effort is uniform), proving its theoretical robustness.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Single-Attribute Focus: The current model simplifies "value" into a single numerical score. In the real world, customers care about a vector of attributes: price, carbon footprint, reliability, and speed. The authors suggest moving toward multi-attribute decision-making (MADM) in future iterations.
  • Scalability: While the 7x8 example proves the logic, real-world 4PL platforms might manage thousands of entities. The authors note that the next step is embedding this logic into high-performance recommendation systems to handle large-scale logistics problems.
  • Dynamic Psychology: The model assumes a participant's psychology is fixed for the duration of the match. Future research could explore how psychology shifts as deadlines approach.

Summary updated

Abstract

As a supply chain integrator, a fourth party logistics (4PL) typically does not have its own logistics facilities, so the 4PL needs to match third party logistics (3PLs) and customers to meet customers' logistics service demands. An effective matching method can not only improve the efficiency of 4PL supply chain management, but also establish more long-term and stable cooperative relationships with customers and 3PLs. Therefore, we propose a novel two-sided logistics matching method considering the trading psychology and matching effort of matching subjects under the 4PL. First, based on considering the trading psychology, the concepts of blocking pair and stable matching are redefined. Then, based on the public values and matching effort of customers and 3PLs, the evaluation values of customers and 3PLs are calculated. And the trading possibilities of customers and 3PLs are calculated by considering the fairness threshold. Next, we consider different stable matching demands of customers and 3PLs and develop a bi-objective matching model to maximize the trading possibilities of both customers and 3PLs. Furthermore, the properties of the proposed method are discussed. Finally, a numerical example and comparison analysis are provided to prove the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed method.
BibTeX
@article{yuan2023two,
  author = {Na Yuan and Haiming Liang and Min Huang and Qing Wang},
  title = {{A two-sided logistics matching method considering trading psychology and matching effort under a 4PL}},
  journal = {International Journal of Industrial Engineering Computations},
  year = {2023},
  doi = {10.5267/j.ijiec.2023.9.001},
}

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