A Security Framework for Chemical Functions

Frederik Walter, Hrishi Narayanan, Jessica Bariffi, Anne Lüscher, Rawad Bitar, Robert Grass, Antonia Wachter-Zeh, Zohar YakhiniarXiv 2026 · arXiv

TL;DR

This paper introduces a formal security framework for "Chemical Functions" (CFs)—noisy, chemistry-driven challenge-response primitives analogous to Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs). By rigorously defining properties like robustness and unclonability through cryptographic security games, the authors provide a principled methodology for designing and analyzing DNA-based authentication and distributed key generation systems.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

In an increasingly globalized world, binding digital trust to physical objects—like pharmaceuticals, luxury goods, or critical infrastructure components—remains a major challenge. While Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) provide hardware-based security anchors, they are typically tied to specific electronic components or surfaces.

Chemical systems offer a promising alternative: security mechanisms that can be embedded throughout the volume of a material. However, the field has lacked a unified language. Prior works often used domain-specific abstractions and incomparable metrics, making it difficult to assess adversarial risks or compare different chemical schemes. This paper bridges the gap between chemistry and cryptography by formalizing the "Chemical Function Infrastructure" (CFI).

Methods

The authors adapt the rigorous methodology of modern cryptography to the chemical domain. Key methodological contributions include:

  • Formal Definitions: They define the Chemical Function (CF) as a noisy mapping from digital challenges to chemical states and back to digital responses. They further define the Chemical Function System (CFS), which includes an extraction algorithm to handle inherent chemical noise, and the Chemical Function Infrastructure (CFI), covering the entire generation and evaluation lifecycle.
  • Security Games: To define "security," the authors specify formal games (e.g., the Chosen Challenge Attack Cloning Game) that define exactly what an adversary can do (query an oracle) and what constitutes a "break" (creating a functional clone).
  • Mathematical Modeling: The framework uses binomial distributions to model sequencing noise and information-theoretic tools like Jaccard similarity and entropy to bound an adversary's success probability.
  • Instantiations: The framework is applied to two DNA-based schemes:
  • Operable Random DNA (orDNA): Uses massive pools of random DNA sequences where specific primers (challenges) amplify unique subsets (responses).
  • Genomic Sequence Encryption (GSE): Uses rare, targeted edits in a large genome as a security anchor.

*Fig.

  1. The digital-to-chemical-to-digital pipeline of a Chemical Function, highlighting the noise present at every stage.*

Datasets

The paper does not introduce a new experimental dataset but rather uses parameters and noise models derived from two landmark studies:

  • orDNA parameters from Luescher et al. (2024), involving pools of up to $10^{10}$ random sequences.
  • GSE parameters from Volf et al. (2023), focusing on base-editing error rates (e.g., 0.1% edit rates and 3.6% sequencing error rates).

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Divisibility is the Killer App: Unlike electronic PUFs, which are bound to a single device, chemical functions are divisible. A batch of "security-infused" liquid can be divided into thousands of vials, each retaining the same security profile. This enables distributed key generation, where multiple parties can derive the same secret key from their respective samples of the same chemical pool.
  • Unpredictability vs. Unclonability: The authors show that in an asymptotic setting (as the security parameter $n$ grows), unpredictability is a stronger requirement than unclonability. If you can't predict the response, you certainly can't build a clone that mimics it.
  • Blunting as a Defense: For DNA-based systems, the authors highlight "blunting" (cleaving DNA handles) as a critical chemical defense against "Chemical Amplification" attacks, effectively making the DNA a one-way function that can be read but not easily copied.

Key Results

  • orDNA Security Bounds: The authors calculate that the orDNA scheme is exceptionally secure, with a cloning success probability of less than $10^{-280}$ under their model. Its average robustness (the probability that a valid user gets the correct response) is near-perfect at $\approx 1 - 1.7 \times 10^{-15}$.
  • GSE Decision Boundaries: For Genomic Sequence Encryption, the paper derives a maximum-likelihood decision boundary for identifying "key-sites" (edited positions) amidst sequencing noise. This allows for the calculation of exact error probabilities ($P_{err}$) based on the number of sequencing reads ($q$).
  • Asymptotic Proofs: They formally prove that a "multi-stage" orDNA approach (using multiple rounds of selection PCR) achieves asymptotic unclonability, meaning the security grows exponentially with the length of the DNA sequences used.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Noise Model Simplifications: The current analysis assumes independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) noise. Real-world chemical noise (like PCR bias or sequencing artifacts) is often more complex and correlated.
  • Adversarial Capabilities: The framework primarily focuses on "Measure and Recreate" attacks. While it mentions dilution and chemical amplification, a more granular cost-benefit analysis of these laboratory-based attacks is left for future work.
  • Substrate Diversity: While the paper focuses on DNA, the authors note that the framework should be applied to other chemical systems, such as mixtures of fluorescent dyes or complex molecular networks, to test its universality.

Summary updated

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce chemical functions, a unified framework that models chemical systems as noisy challenge--response primitives, and formalize the associated chemical function infrastructure. Building on the theory of physical functions, we rigorously define robustness, unclonability, and unpredictability for chemical functions in both finite and asymptotic regimes, and specify security games that capture the adversary's power and the security goals. We instantiate the framework with two existing DNA-based constructions (operable random DNA and Genomic Sequence Encryption) and derive quantitative bounds for robustness, unclonability, and unpredictability. Our analysis develops maximum-likelihood verification rules under sequencing noise and partial-edit models, and provides high-precision estimates based on binomial distributions to guide parameter selection. The framework, definitions, and analyses yield a reproducible methodology for designing chemically unclonable authentication mechanisms. We demonstrate applications to in-product authentication and to shared key generation using standard extraction techniques.
BibTeX
@misc{walter2026security,
  author = {Frederik Walter and Hrishi Narayanan and Jessica Bariffi and Anne Lüscher and Rawad Bitar and Robert Grass and Antonia Wachter-Zeh and Zohar Yakhini},
  title = {{A Security Framework for Chemical Functions}},
  year = {2026},
  eprint = {2601.14019},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.14019},
}
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