A Secure and Cooperative Departure Protocol for Connected Automated Platoons

Farah-Emma Braiteh, David Tse, Ounas Yhia, Francesca Bassi, Rida Khatoun2025 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper introduces a novel, decentralized protocol for connected automated vehicles to securely and cooperatively leave a platoon. It addresses the critical vulnerability of departure maneuvers, demonstrating how malicious actors can disrupt platoon stability and proposing countermeasures to ensure integrity.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Connected and automated vehicles (CAVs) are increasingly forming platoons to enhance road safety and fuel efficiency. These platoons rely heavily on vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication for synchronized movement. However, this reliance also introduces significant cybersecurity risks. While existing research has explored securing platoons against external threats, this paper focuses on a specific, yet crucial, internal threat: a malicious vehicle attempting to leave the platoon. Without proper security, a departing vehicle could exploit the communication protocols to inject false information or perform unauthorized maneuvers, potentially destabilizing the entire platoon, causing disruptions, or even leading to accidents. The paper aims to fill this gap by proposing a secure and cooperative protocol specifically for the departure phase.

Methods

The core of this paper is the introduction of a decentralized, secure, and cooperative departure protocol. Unlike centralized approaches where a single leader manages all maneuvers, this protocol distributes the responsibility among platoon members.

Key methodological aspects include:

  • Decentralized Leave Procedure: The protocol allows any platoon member to initiate a departure. It involves a sequence of messages, including a "Start Leave Notification," a "Request to Leave" to the following vehicle, and a "Maneuver Response." This ensures that the platoon is aware and prepared for the departure.
  • Update Platoon Formation Procedure: After a vehicle successfully leaves, a separate procedure is initiated to update the platoon's member list and formation. This is managed by the Leader, who multicasts an "Update Formation" message and awaits acknowledgments.
  • Attack Models: The authors define and analyze specific attack scenarios, including:
  • Unauthorized Maneuver: A vehicle leaves without following the protocol.
  • Fake Leave Maneuver: A vehicle announces departure and completion but remains in the platoon.
  • Malicious Leave and Denial of Service (DoS): A vehicle repeatedly announces departure but never completes it, blocking other operations.
  • Countermeasures: To combat these attacks, the protocol incorporates:
  • Sensor Data Verification: Vehicles monitor distances to preceding and following vehicles to detect unexpected gaps, indicating a departure.
  • V2V and Sensor Data Consistency Verification: Checks are performed to ensure that announced maneuvers align with actual vehicle behavior and sensor readings.
  • Departure Attempts Limit: A limit is set on the number of departure attempts within a short timeframe to identify persistent misbehavior.

The protocol and its security measures were validated using simulations in the Plexe simulator, with the SUMO traffic simulator.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper. The evaluation relies on simulated scenarios rather than real-world datasets.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Departure is a Critical Vulnerability: The paper highlights that the departure phase, often overlooked, is a significant attack vector for platoons. A seemingly simple maneuver can be exploited to cause substantial disruption.
  • Decentralization Enhances Robustness: By distributing control and communication during departure, the protocol becomes more resilient to single points of failure compared to leader-centric approaches.
  • Layered Security is Essential: Combining V2V message consistency checks with physical sensor data verification provides a more robust defense against sophisticated attacks.
  • Misbehavior Detection is Key: The protocol's effectiveness hinges on accurately detecting and reacting to deviations from the expected behavior, such as a vehicle announcing departure but not actually leaving.
  • The "Fake Leave" Attack is Particularly Insidious: This attack can trick the system into updating its formation while the malicious vehicle remains, creating a hidden threat.

Key Results

The simulations demonstrated that:

  • Without security checks: The proposed attacks (Unauthorized Leave, Fake Leave, Malicious Leave/DoS) were successful in destabilizing the platoon's formation and operations. For instance, in the "Fake Leave Maneuver" without checks, the platoon updated its member list, but the attacker remained, posing a risk.
  • With implemented countermeasures: The protocol successfully detected and mitigated these attacks.
  • Unauthorized Leave: Sensor data verification detected the unexpected gap, prompting a formation update and preventing the attacker from influencing decisions.
  • Fake Leave: V2V and sensor data consistency checks identified the discrepancy between announced and actual behavior, leading to the platoon splitting to isolate the attacker.
  • Malicious Leave/DoS: The combination of data consistency and departure attempt limits effectively prevented continuous disruption, eventually leading to the platoon splitting and rejecting further join requests from the attacker.

Limitations and Future Work

The authors acknowledge several limitations and suggest future research directions:

  • Assumption of Trustworthy Members: The current protocol assumes that all platoon members, except for the departing vehicle, are trustworthy. Future work should focus on addressing this assumption by evaluating trust in members and protecting against internal attacks from non-departing vehicles.
  • Scalability: A comprehensive performance evaluation is needed to assess the protocol's scalability, particularly its ability to handle a growing number of platoon members and maintain security and operational integrity under varying conditions.
  • Communication Failures: The current work does not address scenarios involving communication failures during the update procedure.
  • Complex Maneuvers: The protocol primarily focuses on the departure maneuver. Extending it to other complex maneuvers and their associated security implications would be beneficial.
  • Real-World Validation: While simulations are valuable, real-world testing would be crucial to validate the protocol's effectiveness in diverse and dynamic driving environments.

Summary updated

Abstract

Cooperative and automated vehicular platoons enhance road safety and reduce traffic congestion by enabling vehicles to travel closely together and maneuver in a synchronized manner. This synchronization relies on vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications, which, while beneficial, also introduce vulnerabilities to potential cyberattacks. In this paper, we introduce a new cooperative and secure protocol for platoon departures, focusing specifically on the departure phase. We demonstrate that, without security measures, a vehicle attempting to leave the platoon could exploit the leave messages of the platoon protocol and introduce attacks that may disrupt the formation of the platoon or even jeopardize its stability. To mitigate this risk, we propose data consistency measures that protect both the stability and integrity of the platoon. Simulations conducted using Plexe simulator validate the security of the proposed protocol through rigorous security assessments.
BibTeX
@misc{braiteh2025secure,
  author = {Farah-Emma Braiteh and David Tse and Ounas Yhia and Francesca Bassi and Rida Khatoun},
  title = {{A Secure and Cooperative Departure Protocol for Connected Automated Platoons}},
  year = {2025},
  doi = {10.1109/ntms65597.2025.11076683},
}
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