A Note on Time Inconsistency and Endogenous Exits from a Currency Union

Yuta SaitoGames 2022 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper explores how countries leaving a currency union can undermine the union's ability to maintain a stable, inflation-free monetary policy. The authors demonstrate that if even one country exits, the common currency's credibility suffers, leading to an inflation bias. This suggests that for optimal monetary policy, currency unions must be designed to prevent members from leaving.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

The paper tackles the challenge of maintaining a credible and stable monetary policy within a currency union, particularly when member countries have the option to leave. Traditional economic models of monetary policy, like the Barro-Gordon model, highlight the problem of "time inconsistency" – where a central bank might be tempted to inflate the currency to boost output in the short term, even though this is detrimental in the long run. Currency unions are often formed to enhance monetary policy credibility by pooling resources and adopting a common, potentially more disciplined, policy. However, the possibility of countries exiting the union introduces a new layer of complexity. If countries can leave, they might do so when it's individually beneficial, potentially destabilizing the remaining union and its commitment to low inflation. This paper investigates whether an optimal, inflation-bias-free outcome is achievable when countries can endogenously decide to exit.

Methods

The authors extend the canonical Barro-Gordon model of discretionary monetary policymaking to a currency union setting with an endogenous exit option. The model features $N$ heterogeneous member countries, each with a social loss function that penalizes inflation and rewards output growth. Output shocks are country-specific and assumed to be uncorrelated.

The core of the methodology involves:

  • Backward Induction: The analysis proceeds by solving the model from the last stage of decision-making (inflation setting) backward to the first (exit decisions).
  • Median Voter Theorem: In the currency union, the common inflation rate is determined by majority voting. The paper applies the median voter theorem, assuming that the median voter's preference dictates the union's inflation rate.
  • Rational Expectations: The private sector is assumed to form rational expectations about future inflation, which influences current policy decisions.
  • Exit Decision Logic: A member country chooses to remain in the union if its social loss from staying is less than its social loss from exiting (which includes a fixed exit cost).

The paper analytically derives conditions for achieving an optimal outcome (zero inflation bias) under different scenarios, particularly focusing on the impact of member exits.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Exit Destabilizes Policy: The most striking insight is that the optimal outcome (zero inflation bias) is achievable only if no members leave the currency union. Any exit, even by a single member, introduces an inflation bias.
  • Heterogeneity Matters: Countries with higher output shocks prefer lower inflation rates. To achieve an optimal outcome without exits, the voting mechanism within the union should be weighted to give more power to countries with higher output shocks, effectively making a "high-shock" country the median voter.
  • Exit Cost as a Deterrent: A higher exit cost ($d$) makes it more likely for members to remain in the union, thus helping to preserve the optimal policy outcome.
  • Institutional Design is Crucial: The paper emphasizes that the design of the currency union's institutions, including voting rules and exit costs, is paramount for achieving stable monetary policy.

Key Results

  • Result 1: In a currency union without exit options, the optimal outcome (zero inflation bias) can be achieved if and only if the median voter's output shock is equal to the target output growth rate ($e_m = k$). This can be achieved through a weighted voting rule that favors countries with higher output shocks.
  • Result 2: In an environment where more than one member leaves the currency union, an inflation bias always arises. This means the optimal outcome is impossible if multiple countries exit.
  • Corollary 1: The optimal outcome is realized if and only if the median voter's shock equals the target growth rate ($e_m = k$) AND no members exit the union ($p=1$, where $p$ is the probability of remaining).

Limitations and Future Work

  • Ex-Ante Identical Countries: The model assumes countries are ex-ante identical in terms of their preferences and potential shocks, which is a simplification. Future work could consider ex-ante heterogeneity in expected output rates.
  • One-Shot Game: The model treats the decision to exit as a one-shot decision, without considering long-term consequences or repeated interactions. The authors suggest this can be interpreted as governments prioritizing short-term welfare gains for near-term elections.
  • Exogenous Exit Cost: The exit cost is treated as exogenous. The paper notes that this cost could be endogenously chosen during the institutional design phase, which would be an interesting avenue for further research.
  • Focus on Inflation Bias: The primary focus is on achieving zero inflation bias. Future research could explore other aspects of optimal currency union design, such as managing sovereign debt defaults or the implications of explicit formation phases.
  • Numerical Equilibrium Characterization: The paper mentions that a full characterization of an equilibrium outcome requires specifying the distribution of shocks and parameter values, often necessitating numerical solutions. This suggests that further numerical analysis could provide deeper insights.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@article{saito2022note,
  author = {Yuta Saito},
  title = {{A Note on Time Inconsistency and Endogenous Exits from a Currency Union}},
  journal = {Games},
  year = {2022},
  doi = {10.3390/g13020021},
}
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