A modular framework for iterative combinatorial auctions

Sébastien Lahaie, David C. ParkesSIGecom Exch 2008 · DOI · OpenReview

Abstract

We describe a modular elicitation framework for iterative combinatorial auctions. The framework includes proxy agents, each of which can adopt an individualized bidding language to represent partial value information of a bidder. The framework leverages algorithms from query learning to elicit value information via bids as the auction progresses. The approach reduces the multi-agent elicitation problem to isolated, single-agent learning problems, with competitive equilibrium prices used to facilitate auction clearing even without complete learning.
BibTeX
@article{lahaie2008modular,
  author = {Sébastien Lahaie and David C. Parkes},
  title = {{A modular framework for iterative combinatorial auctions}},
  journal = {SIGecom Exch.},
  year = {2008},
  doi = {10.1145/1399589.1399597},
}

Loading related content...

Figure