A modular framework for iterative combinatorial auctions
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Abstract
We describe a modular elicitation framework for iterative combinatorial auctions. The framework includes proxy agents, each of which can adopt an individualized bidding language to represent partial value information of a bidder. The framework leverages algorithms from query learning to elicit value information via bids as the auction progresses. The approach reduces the multi-agent elicitation problem to isolated, single-agent learning problems, with competitive equilibrium prices used to facilitate auction clearing even without complete learning.
BibTeX
@article{lahaie2008modular,
author = {Sébastien Lahaie and David C. Parkes},
title = {{A modular framework for iterative combinatorial auctions}},
journal = {SIGecom Exch.},
year = {2008},
doi = {10.1145/1399589.1399597},
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