A JiT-Based Denoising Defense Method Against Adversarial Examples for Radio Signal Automatic Modulation Classification

Shiwei Liu, Linyuan Wang, Nuolin Sun, Libin Hou, Bin YanarXiv 2026 · arXiv

TL;DR

Researchers have developed a new defense against adversarial attacks on radio signal classifiers by adapting diffusion-based denoising techniques. By training a 1D Transformer to project corrupted signals back onto a "manifold" of clean data, the method achieves significantly higher robust accuracy and generalizes to unseen attack types far better than traditional adversarial training—all while being over 12 times faster to train.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Automatic Modulation Classification (AMC) is a vital tool for spectrum monitoring and electronic warfare, allowing systems to identify how a radio signal is encoded (e.g., QPSK, 16QAM). While Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have revolutionized AMC, they are notoriously fragile. A malicious actor can add imperceptible "adversarial perturbations" to a signal, tricking a classifier into misidentifying a legitimate transmission or enabling signal spoofing.

The standard defense, adversarial training (AT), involves generating attacks during the training process so the model learns to ignore them. However, AT is computationally expensive and often fails when faced with attack methods it hasn't seen before. The authors seek a more "universal" defense that doesn't require prior knowledge of the specific attack strategy.

Methods

The authors propose a denoising defense inspired by Just image Transformers (JiT), a generative diffusion model. The core idea is that clean radio signals live on a low-dimensional "manifold" (a structured surface) within the high-dimensional space of all possible signal data. Adversarial attacks push signals off this manifold.

Figure 1: Schematic illustration of the JiT denoising defense method.

Key components include:

  • 1D Transformer Denoising Network: Unlike the original JiT designed for 2D images, this model uses a 1D architecture tailored for I/Q (In-phase/Quadrature) radio data. It features a bottleneck patch embedding to capture local signal segments and a six-layer Transformer to model long-range correlations.
  • Flow Matching: Instead of traditional diffusion training, the model is optimized via flow matching to directly predict clean signal samples. This allows the network to learn the mapping from an arbitrary noisy point back to the clean manifold.
  • Direct Denoising Inference: During deployment, an incoming signal (potentially adversarial) is treated as a "noisy" starting point. The network projects it onto the clean manifold at a specific "start time" ($t_{start}$), effectively stripping away the adversarial noise before it ever reaches the classifier.
Figure 2: Structure of the signal denoising network.

Datasets

The study utilizes the RML2018.01A dataset, a standard benchmark in the AMC community. They focused on a subset with a Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) of 10 dB, covering 24 distinct modulation types (ranging from simple OOK to complex 256QAM). The signals are represented as $1024 \times 2$ I/Q arrays.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Adversarial Perturbations as Noise: By viewing adversarial attacks simply as a form of structured noise that deviates from the clean data distribution, the researchers can use generative modeling to "purify" the input.
  • Generalization through Manifold Learning: Because the denoiser learns what clean signals look like rather than what attacks look like, it is inherently more robust to new, unseen attack methods (like DeepFool or C&W) that typically break models defended by standard adversarial training.
  • The $t_{start}$ Trade-off: The authors identified a critical balance in the denoising start time. If $t_{start}$ is too low, the denoising is too aggressive and damages the underlying signal; if it's too high, the adversarial noise isn't fully removed.
  • Efficiency Gains: Training the denoiser only requires clean data. This eliminates the need to solve complex optimization problems to generate adversarial examples during training, leading to a massive reduction in computational overhead.

Key Results

The proposed JiT-based defense was compared against a ResNet-1D classifier protected by PGD-based adversarial training.

  • Robustness: Under PGD attacks, the method showed a relative improvement in robust accuracy of at least 20.58%. At higher attack strengths, this improvement jumped to 39.72%.
  • Clean Accuracy: Unlike many defenses that degrade performance on normal data, this method improved classification accuracy on clean examples by 10.20% relative to the baseline.
  • Unseen Attacks: The model significantly outperformed adversarial training against "unseen" attacks like AutoAttack, DeepFool, and C&W. For instance, under strong DeepFool attacks, the JiT defense maintained ~60% accuracy while adversarial training dropped to ~30%.
  • Training Speed: The JiT denoising network required only 1.21 GPU-hours to train, compared to 14.68 GPU-hours for adversarial training—a nearly 92% reduction in time.

Limitations and Future Work

The authors acknowledge that the selection of the denoising start time ($t_{start}$) is currently empirical and fixed. In a real-world scenario where attack strengths vary dynamically, a fixed $t_{start}$ might not always be optimal.

Future research could explore adaptive denoising, where the model automatically estimates the required denoising strength based on the input signal's characteristics. Additionally, testing the method in more diverse, real-world electromagnetic environments with varying interference levels would be a logical next step.

Summary updated

Abstract

Automatic modulation classification (AMC) of radio signals is a core technology for spectrum monitoring and electromagnetic situational awareness. Deep neural networks (DNNs) play an important role in this field owing to their powerful feature extraction capabilities and end-to-end learning paradigm. However, their vulnerability to adversarial attacks poses serious security challenges to practical deployment. Adversarial training, a common defense, has limitations including poor generalization across attack types and high training costs. Inspired by Just image Transformers (JiT), a diffusion generative model that directly predicts clean images, this paper proposes a JiT-based denoising defense against adversarial examples for radio signal modulation classification. During training, a signal-specific 1D Transformer denoising network is optimized via flow matching to directly predict clean signal samples. It thereby learns a mapping that projects arbitrary examples back onto the low-dimensional manifold of clean signal examples. During inference, arbitrary examples are fed into the trained network and directly projected onto this manifold. This enables denoising defense without prior knowledge of attacks. Experiments on the RML2018.01A dataset were conducted without attack information, using a single empirically selected, fixed denoising start time. Compared with PGD-based adversarial training, the proposed method achieves a relative improvement of at least 20.58% in robust accuracy under PGD attacks. It also achieves a relative improvement of 10.20% in classification accuracy on clean examples. When evaluated against attack types unseen during adversarial training, the proposed method provides stronger defense than adversarial training. In particular, at higher attack strengths, it achieves a relative improvement of at least 39.72% in robust accuracy.
BibTeX
@misc{liu2026jit,
  author = {Shiwei Liu and Linyuan Wang and Nuolin Sun and Libin Hou and Bin Yan},
  title = {{A JiT-Based Denoising Defense Method Against Adversarial Examples for Radio Signal Automatic Modulation Classification}},
  year = {2026},
  eprint = {2610.35084},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.35084},
}
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