A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Auditing Differentially Private Algorithms with Epistemically Disparate Herd

Ya-Ting Yang, Tao Zhang, Quanyan ZhuGamesec 2023 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper introduces a game-theoretic framework to analyze how "herd audits" by diverse end-users can incentivize developers of privacy-preserving algorithms to be more accountable. It models the interaction as a Stackelberg game, showing that herd audits are effective when users have low costs for accessing information, and that developers are more likely to comply when faced with such audits.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

As AI and algorithmic decision-making become ubiquitous, ensuring these systems are fair, transparent, and adhere to ethical standards is crucial. This is particularly challenging for privacy-preserving algorithms, where developers might claim a certain level of privacy protection (e.g., differential privacy) but have incentives to deviate for better performance. Traditional audits can be costly and time-consuming. "Herd audits," which leverage collective intelligence from a diverse group of end-users, offer a more democratic and cost-effective alternative. However, a key challenge is "epistemic disparity" – users have varying levels of expertise and access to information, which can impact audit effectiveness. This paper aims to systematically analyze how herd audits, considering these epistemic disparities, can influence algorithm developers' behavior and promote responsible development.

Methods

The authors frame the interaction between algorithm developers and herd auditors as a Stackelberg game. In this model, the developer acts as the leader, setting the algorithm's privacy parameters, while the auditors (end-users) act as followers, performing the audit.

Key methodological components include:

  • Rational Inattention Model: This model is used to capture the costs associated with auditors acquiring information. Auditors face a trade-off between the utility of their decision and the cost of gaining information, quantified by an "epistemic factor" ($\lambda$). A higher $\lambda$ means higher costs for reducing uncertainty.
  • Bayes Hypothesis Testing: Auditors use this to make decisions about algorithm compliance, weighing prior beliefs against acquired information.
  • Game Theory: The core framework is a Stackelberg game, allowing for the analysis of sequential decision-making and optimal strategies for both the developer (leader) and auditors (followers).
  • Differential Privacy (e-DP): The paper uses the definition of e-differential privacy to model the privacy claims and potential deviations by developers.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper. The analysis is theoretical and game-theoretic, relying on simulated scenarios and mathematical derivations rather than empirical datasets.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Herd Audits as an Accountability Threat: The study demonstrates that herd audits can indeed act as a credible threat, incentivizing developers to uphold their privacy claims.
  • The Importance of Low Information Costs: The effectiveness of herd audits is highly dependent on the cost end-users incur to access relevant information. When these costs are low (small epistemic factor $\lambda$), auditors are more confident and the audit is more impactful.
  • Developer's Incentive to Deviate: Developers have an incentive to use a higher privacy budget (less privacy) than claimed if it leads to better algorithm accuracy, especially if the risk of detection is low.
  • Epistemic Disparity Matters: Auditors with lower epistemic factors (easier access to information) exhibit higher audit confidence and better performance, highlighting the need to consider user capabilities.
  • Trade-off in Developer Strategy: Irresponsible developers aim to maximize both algorithm accuracy and the probability of passing the audit (avoiding penalties).

Key Results

  • Optimal Auditor Strategy: The optimal strategy for auditors involves balancing the cost of information acquisition with the utility of their audit decision. Auditors with lower epistemic factors are more confident.
  • Optimal Developer Strategy: The irresponsible developer's strategy is to choose the privacy parameter ($\epsilon$) that maximizes a combination of algorithm accuracy and the probability of successfully passing the audit.
  • Impact of Epistemic Factor: A smaller epistemic factor ($\lambda$) for auditors leads to a more effective herd audit, making developers less likely to deviate. Conversely, a larger $\lambda$ can make developers more likely to violate claims.
  • Qualitative Findings: The paper provides qualitative insights into how different levels of epistemic disparity and developer risk aversion influence audit outcomes and developer behavior.

Limitations and Future Work

  • Limitations:
    • The analysis is theoretical and relies on simplified assumptions about developer behavior and auditor capabilities.
  • The paper focuses on a specific type of privacy (differential privacy) and a specific game structure (Stackelberg).
  • The "rational inattention" model, while powerful, is a simplification of complex human cognitive processes.
  • Future Work:
    • Enriching the framework to incorporate end-users' incentives more directly.
  • Designing incentive mechanisms to encourage participation in herd audits.
  • Exploring hybrid audit models combining distributed and central audit centers.
  • Extending the analysis to other types of privacy and algorithmic systems.
  • Investigating the fusion of decentralized hypothesis testing, game theory, information theory, and differential privacy for more advanced audit systems.

Summary updated

BibTeX
@inproceedings{yang2023game,
  author = {Ya-Ting Yang and Tao Zhang and Quanyan Zhu},
  title = {{A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Auditing Differentially Private Algorithms with Epistemically Disparate Herd}},
  booktitle = {Gamesec},
  year = {2023},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-50670-3\_18},
}
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