TL;DR
This paper investigates how a "cap-and-trade" carbon regulation impacts pricing and profit in dual-channel supply chains (online and offline). It proposes price discount contracts to coordinate these channels, showing that online discounts are more effective and can achieve near-centralized system profits through a transfer payment mechanism.
What Problem Does This Paper Address?
Modern businesses increasingly operate with both traditional brick-and-mortar retail (offline) and direct-to-consumer online channels. This "dual-channel" approach presents opportunities but also challenges, as channel pricing and competition can negatively affect overall supply chain performance. Simultaneously, growing environmental concerns have led governments to implement carbon regulations, such as "cap-and-trade" systems, which impose costs on carbon emissions. This paper addresses the complex interplay between these two trends: how carbon regulations affect pricing and profitability in dual-channel supply chains, and how to coordinate these channels under such regulations to achieve better outcomes. Specifically, it asks how to optimize pricing and profits when both channel prices influence demand and carbon emissions are regulated, and whether specific contracts can improve coordination in a decentralized system.
Methods
The authors employ a supplier-Stackelberg game model to analyze the supply chain. This means the supplier acts as the leader, setting wholesale prices and online channel prices, while the retailer (acting as the follower) sets offline channel prices. They first analyze two scenarios:
- Centralized System: The supplier and retailer make decisions jointly to maximize the total supply chain profit.
- Decentralized System: The supplier and retailer make decisions independently, leading to potential sub-optimization.
The core of their contribution lies in proposing and analyzing two price discount contracts to coordinate the decentralized system:
- Online Channel Price Discount Contract: The wholesale price is a discount of the online channel's selling price.
- Offline Channel Price Discount Contract: The wholesale price is a discount of the offline channel's selling price.
They derive optimal pricing strategies and profit functions for each scenario and contract, then use numerical examples to illustrate the effects of carbon regulation parameters (like the unit price of carbon trade) and discount coefficients on pricing, profits, and coordination effectiveness. A transfer payment mechanism is also discussed as a way to ensure win-win outcomes for both parties under the coordination contracts.
Datasets
Not discussed in the paper. The study relies on a theoretical model and numerical simulations with parameters defined by the authors.
Key Insights and Ideas
- Carbon Regulation Impacts Pricing: The unit price of carbon trade and the level of carbon emissions directly influence optimal retail prices, generally leading to higher prices under stricter carbon regulations. This highlights the effectiveness of cap-and-trade in incentivizing emission reduction.
- Decentralization Hurts Profits: The decentralized system consistently yields lower total profits compared to the centralized system, underscoring the need for coordination.
- Online Channel Discounts are More Effective: The proposed online channel price discount contract proves more effective in coordinating the supply chain and improving profits compared to the offline channel discount contract.
- Transfer Payments are Key for Win-Win: While coordination contracts can improve overall profits, achieving a "win-win" for both the supplier and retailer often requires a transfer payment mechanism. This mechanism redistributes the gains from coordination to ensure both parties benefit.
- Carbon Capacity Matters for Profit: The ability to sell or buy excess carbon credits (depending on whether emissions are below or above the cap) significantly impacts supplier and retailer profits.
Key Results
- Profit Gap: Numerical examples show that the decentralized system's profit can be 9.42% lower than the centralized system's profit under certain carbon trade prices.
- Coordination Effectiveness: The online channel price discount contract can achieve near-centralized system profits when the discount coefficient (λ) is appropriately set (e.g., λ = 0.4).
- Impact of Carbon Price: Higher unit prices of carbon trade lead to reduced carbon emissions but can also influence profit trends, sometimes causing profits to decrease initially before increasing as firms leverage carbon credit trading.
- Contract Comparison: The study concludes that the online channel price discount contract is generally superior to the offline channel price discount contract for coordinating the dual-channel supply chain under carbon regulations.
Limitations and Future Work
The authors acknowledge several areas for future research:
- Random Demand: The current model assumes deterministic demand. Future work could explore dual-channel supply chains with random demand under carbon regulations.
- Asymmetric Information: The study assumes perfect information. Investigating competitive equilibrium in dual-channel supply chains with asymmetric information and carbon regulations is suggested.
- More Complex Regulations: Exploring other carbon regulations beyond cap-and-trade, or combinations thereof, could provide broader insights.
- Multi-Echelon Supply Chains: Extending the analysis to more complex, multi-echelon supply chain structures would be valuable.
Summary updated