A Defense Technique against ARP Spoofing Attacks using a Keystone Authentication Table in the OpenStack Cloud Environment

Hyo Sung Kang, Choong Seon HongJournal of KIISE 2018 · DOI

TL;DR

This paper proposes a novel defense mechanism against ARP spoofing attacks in OpenStack cloud environments. By leveraging OpenStack's Keystone authentication service to create and manage a reliable ARP table, the authors present a method to validate ARP reply messages, thereby preventing malicious redirection of network traffic and protecting virtual machine resources.

What Problem Does This Paper Address?

Cloud computing offers significant benefits like cost reduction and improved efficiency, leading to widespread adoption. However, a major hurdle to its expansion is security. Specifically, virtual machines (VMs) within cloud environments are vulnerable to external attacks like ARP spoofing and poison attacks. These attacks can compromise the integrity of cloud systems, leading to performance degradation and hindering the broader adoption of cloud services. While existing research has attempted to address these issues, many proposed solutions are either impractical due to reliance on new protocols or suffer from scalability limitations in large-scale networks. This paper tackles the challenge of securing OpenStack environments against ARP spoofing by proposing a practical and scalable defense technique.

Methods

The core of the proposed defense technique lies in utilizing OpenStack's Keystone authentication service to build and maintain a trusted ARP table. The process involves two main components:

  1. IP/MAC Information Collection: When a new instance is created in an OpenStack environment (specifically using Nova-Network), its IP and MAC address information is automatically collected and stored in the controller node's database.
  2. Authentication Table Generation with Keystone: This collected information is then used to construct an authentication table. OpenStack's Keystone service, responsible for authentication and authorization, plays a crucial role here. Keystone assigns unique authentication IDs to the IP/MAC pairs and manages the authentication table. This ensures that only authorized entities can access and modify the table, significantly enhancing its reliability. The table also includes an idle time for each entry, which is updated upon use, helping to maintain the table's size and keep it current.
  3. Comparison Handler: A "Comparison Handler" is introduced, which intercepts ARP reply messages. Before these messages are forwarded to their intended recipients, they are first processed by the controller node. Here, the handler compares the IP and MAC addresses in the ARP reply message against the trusted authentication table managed by Keystone. If a mismatch is detected, the ARP reply message is considered malicious and is blocked, thus preventing the ARP spoofing attack.

Datasets

Not discussed in the paper. The paper focuses on a simulated OpenStack environment and its internal data structures rather than external datasets.

Key Insights and Ideas

  • Leveraging Existing Infrastructure: The most significant insight is the clever repurposing of OpenStack's Keystone service, an existing component, for security purposes. This avoids the need for introducing new, potentially incompatible protocols or external hardware.
  • Centralized Trust Anchor: By using Keystone to manage the ARP table, the system establishes a single, trusted source of truth for IP-MAC mappings within the OpenStack environment. This centralized approach simplifies management and enhances security.
  • Proactive Defense: The mechanism acts as a proactive defense by validating ARP replies before they can mislead VMs, rather than relying on detection after an attack has already occurred.
  • Scalability through OpenStack Architecture: The design leverages the inherent scalability of OpenStack. Since the comparison handler resides on the controller node, adding more compute nodes to the cloud environment doesn't fundamentally break the defense mechanism.

Key Results

The paper demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed technique through a simulated ARP spoofing attack scenario.

  • Before Attack: The ARP table of Host(1) shows legitimate IP-MAC mappings for gateway, Instance(1), compute node, and attack host.
  • After Spoofing (Without Defense): In a standard ARP spoofing attack, the ARP table of Host(1) is corrupted. The MAC address for Instance(1) is replaced with the attacker's MAC address, indicating successful redirection.
  • After Spoofing (With Proposed Technique): When the proposed defense mechanism is applied, the ARP table of Host(1) remains unchanged even after the ARP spoofing attack. This indicates that the malicious ARP reply messages were successfully intercepted and blocked by the Comparison Handler, preserving the integrity of the ARP table.

Limitations and Future Work

The authors acknowledge a few limitations:

  • Targeting Critical Nodes: The proposed defense is less effective if the attacker directly targets the Gateway or the hypervisor services on the compute nodes themselves.
  • Resource Overhead: Maintaining the authentication table and the comparison handler consumes some computational resources, which could be considered a minor waste of resources in a cloud environment where resource management is critical.

Despite these limitations, the authors believe their proposed technique overcomes the drawbacks of previous research and, with further improvements, could be readily applied to real-world network environments. Future work could focus on addressing the limitations related to targeting critical nodes and optimizing resource utilization.

Summary updated

Abstract

최근 많은 전 세계 기업들은 비용절감, 성능개선, 업무프로세스의 혁신을 목적으로 클라우드 서비스를 도입하고 있지만 클라우드 내 가상머신을 대상으로 하는 외부 스푸핑 또는 Poison 공격으로 인해 발생 될 수 있는 클라우드 시스템의 성능 저하는 클라우드 컴퓨팅 시스템 확산에 많은 걸림돌이 되고 있다. 이런 보안사고를 예방하기위해 많은 연구가 진행되었지만 실현가능성이 낮은 새로운 프로토콜의 제안, 대규모 네트워크에 적용하기 어려운 확장성의 한계를 가지고 있다. 이에 본 논문에서는 최근 많은 클라우드 서비스 개발 회사가 차용하고 있는 오픈소스 클라우드 플랫폼인 OpenStack을 이용하여 클라우드 환경을 구축하고 OpenStack의 인증서비스를 제공하는 Keystone을 이용한 인증 테이블을 통하여 스푸핑 혹은 Poison이라 불리는 네트워크 공격에 대한 방어기법을 제안하고자 한다.
BibTeX
@article{kang2018defense,
  author = {Hyo Sung Kang and Choong Seon Hong},
  title = {{A Defense Technique against ARP Spoofing Attacks using a Keystone Authentication Table in the OpenStack Cloud Environment}},
  journal = {Journal of KIISE},
  year = {2018},
  doi = {10.5626/jok.2018.45.8.755},
}

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