Digital Rights Management Workshop
18 papers4 directions
The Digital Rights Management Workshop was an academic venue active from 2001 to 2011, focusing on the technical and theoretical frameworks for protecting digital content and intellectual property. During its decade of activity, the workshop served as a forum for research into the security of both software and hardware systems. Its contributions primarily centered on the development of mechanisms for access control, copyright protection, and the prevention of unauthorized distribution of digital assets.
Research published at the venue explored specialized topics such as integrated circuit digital rights management using physical-level characterization, robust fingerprinting codes, and semi-dynamic watermarking schemes for software applications. Other areas of inquiry included privacy-preserving tracing methods and the development of encryption schemes, such as chameleon encryption, designed to resist known-plaintext attacks. These works often applied computational and algorithmic techniques to ensure the integrity and traceability of digital assets.
The workshop featured contributions from authors such as Farinaz Koushanfar, Miodrag Potkonjak, and Sheng Wei. While its core focus remained on security and cryptography, the venue contributed to the broader research community by examining the intersection of hardware security and algorithmic protection. Its output provided a technical basis for managing digital rights within complex computational environments, bridging the gap between theoretical security and practical implementation in hardware and software systems.
Papers by Year
| 2011 | 1 |
| 2010 | 3 |
| 2009 | 2 |
| 2008 | 2 |
| 2007 | 1 |
| 2006 | 1 |
| 2005 | 2 |
| 2004 | 1 |
| 2003 | 1 |
| 2002 | 2 |
| 2001 | 2 |
Top Research Directions
Research directions most represented by papers from this venue.
Top Authors
Impactful Papers
Papers from this venue that shaped research clusters.
Foundational
Attacking an Obfuscated Cipher by Injecting Faults
foundational
Key Extraction Resistance and the Code L
2002