Abstract
This paper studies the optimal structure of procurement contracts between public and private sectors by mainly comparing two typical procurement types: traditional procurement and public-private partnership (PPP). We first set up a principal-agent model focusing on bundling effects of procurement based on Hart (2003), and Iossa and Martimort (2015) to see under which conditions PPP has advantages over traditional procurement and vice versa. Then, we consider if the Republic of Korea's PPP structure in practice is well designed to maximize efficiency regarding the theoretical model. By reviewing the data on major investors and equity transactions of the Republic of Korea's PPP projects, we show that the bundling effects of PPP contracts, which is one of the main sources of efficiency, is limited under the current economic and political environment and derive policy implications for developing countries implementing PPP projects in the region.
Introduction: The Procurement Dilemma
When a government undertakes large-scale infrastructure projects, such as bridges or highways, it faces a fundamental choice in procurement: Traditional Procurement or a Public–Private Partnership (PPP). In traditional procurement, the government typically hires one firm to design and build the facility and another to operate and maintain it. In a PPP, a single consortium is hired to handle the entire lifecycle.
The theoretical advantage of PPPs lies in the bundling effect. If the same entity responsible for construction is also responsible for long-term maintenance (often 30 years), it has a natural incentive to invest in higher-quality materials and better design upfront to minimize future repair costs. However, this research suggests that in the Republic of Korea, this incentive loop is frequently broken, causing PPPs to revert to the inefficiencies of traditional government contracts.
The Structure of PPP in Korea
In the Republic of Korea, PPP projects are typically organized through a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). This entity acts as the central hub, coordinating between construction companies, professional operators, and financial investors under the oversight of a competent authority.
As shown in Figure 1, the SPV is composed of various stakeholders. Ideally, these stakeholders remain committed throughout the project's lifecycle to internalize costs. However, the study identifies a significant "Incentive Gap." Construction Investors (CIs) often hold approximately 70% of equity at the time of contract signing but reduce their stake to roughly 43% by the time the project enters the operational stage.
Theoretical Modeling and the "Relay" Effect
The researchers employed a principal-agent model to compare three scenarios:
- Traditional Procurement: The builder ignores operating costs entirely.
- The Ideal PPP: A single entity internalizes all lifecycle costs, maximizing efficiency.
- The "Korean-style" PPP: A modified model where the builder intends to sell their stake to financial investors immediately after construction is complete.
The theoretical proof demonstrates that if a builder knows they will exit the project post-construction, their incentive to enhance long-term quality drops to zero. Paradoxically, their effort to lower construction costs becomes "greater than the first best level"—meaning they are incentivized to cut corners aggressively to maximize short-term profit before the hand-off. This "relay" style of ownership, where financial investors only step in once the risky construction phase is over, effectively kills the bundling effect.
Empirical Validation
To test these theories, the study analyzed the InfraInfo database, focusing on 33 operational road PPP projects in the Republic of Korea. The researchers looked at equity structures across four stages: initial signing, design approval, construction, and operation.
The regression analysis confirmed that a greater decrease in a construction investor's share after the initial contract correlates with larger cost reductions during construction. This suggests that exiting firms are not optimizing for project health, but rather for immediate financial gain. Interestingly, projects with a Minimum Revenue Guarantee (MRG) showed significant cost reductions, likely because the guarantee makes the project lucrative enough to keep investors engaged longer, indirectly supporting some efficiency gains.
Policy Implications and Conclusion
The study concludes that the current economic and political environment in Korea limits the bundling effects that are the primary source of PPP efficiency. For a PPP to deliver on its promise, the "Partnership" must last long enough for the private partner to feel the consequences of their construction decisions.
To address these failures, the paper suggests several policy shifts:
- Limit Consortium Dominance: Reducing the number of large construction firms allowed in a single consortium to boost competition.
- Early Financial Involvement: Encouraging financial investors to take a leading role much earlier in the project lifecycle, rather than waiting for the operational phase.
- Sector Expansion: While this study focused on 33 road projects, future research should expand to schools and water treatment facilities to provide a broader view of these incentive structures.
Ultimately, the "holy grail" of PPP efficiency—bundling—requires a stable, long-term commitment from the private sector that current market practices in Korea often undermine.
Summary updated