The Top 10 List

Tim RoughgardenCambridge 2016 · DOI · OpenAlex

Abstract

1. The second-price single-item auction. Our first example of an “ideal” auction, which is dominant-strategy incentive compati ble (DSIC), welfare maximizing, and computationally efficient (Theorem 2.4). Single-item auctions already show how small design changes, such as a first-price vs. a second-price payment rule, can have major ramifications for participant behavior.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{roughgarden2016top,
  author = {Tim Roughgarden},
  title = {{The Top 10 List}},
  booktitle = {Cambridge},
  year = {2016},
  doi = {10.1017/cbo9781316779309.022},
}

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