The Disunity of Morality

Walter Sinnott-ArmstrongOxford 2016 · DOI · OpenAlex

Abstract

Abstract Whenever psychologists, neuroscientists, or philosophers draw conclusions about moral judgments in general from a small selected sample, they assume that moral judgments are unified by some common and distinctive feature that enables generalizations and makes morality worthy of study as a unified field. This chapter defends the idea that morality is disunified by arguing that the content of morality, the neural level of morality, and the function of morality all fail to be unified. It then argues that moral neuroscience should adopt a more fine-grained taxonomic approach that investigates more carefully defined groups of moral judgments.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{sinnottarmstrong2016disunity,
  author = {Walter Sinnott-Armstrong},
  title = {{The Disunity of Morality}},
  booktitle = {Oxford},
  year = {2016},
  doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199357666.003.0015},
}

Loading related content...

Figure