The Distribution of Responsibility and the Economic Vote

Raymond Duch, Randolph T. StevensonCambridge 2008 · DOI · OpenAlex

Abstract

Two theoretical propositions come out of the discussion of administrative responsibility in the last chapter, each of which produces a straightforward hypothesis. The first concerns the distribution of the economic vote across parties. Parties with a greater share of the status quo distribution of administrative responsibility will receive a greater share of the economic vote than parties with a smaller share. The second concerns the overall size of the economic vote across all parties in an election. As the status quo distribution of administrative responsibility over parties becomes more equal, the overall economic vote declines.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{duch2008distribution,
  author = {Raymond Duch and Randolph T. Stevenson and Raymond M Duch},
  title = {{The Distribution of Responsibility and the Economic Vote}},
  booktitle = {Cambridge},
  year = {2008},
  doi = {10.1017/cbo9780511755934.012},
}

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