Some Potential Philosophical Lessons of Implicit Moral Attitudes

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, C. Daryl CameronOxford 2022 · DOI · OpenAlex

Abstract

Abstract Traditional theories about moral judgments adopt one side of a dichotomy between beliefs and desires, emotions, or attitudes, but neither side seems adequate. New intermediate possibilities are opened up if implicit moral attitudes are distinguished from explicit moral beliefs. This chapter summarizes some recent empirical work on implicit moral attitudes, and explores potential philosophical lessons and compromise positions, such as that explicit moral assertions and beliefs are cognitive or propositional but implicit moral attitudes are not; that implicit moral attitudes are internally connected to motivation but explicit moral beliefs are not; that moral responsibility requires both explicit moral beliefs and implicit moral attitudes; and that implicit moral attitudes might be able to stop the sceptical regress, if certain further features of implicit moral attitudes are established. Each of these potential lessons requires further development but seems interesting enough to warrant exploration.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{sinnottarmstrong2022some,
  author = {Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and C. Daryl Cameron},
  title = {{Some Potential Philosophical Lessons of Implicit Moral Attitudes}},
  booktitle = {Oxford},
  year = {2022},
  doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198871712.013.29},
}

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