Revenue-Maximizing Auctions

Tim RoughgardenCambridge 2016 · DOI · OpenAlex

Abstract

Lectures 2-4 focused on the design of mechanisms that maximize, exactly or approximately, the social welfare of the outcome. Revenue is generated in such mechanisms only as a side effect, a necessary evil to incentivize agents to report truthfully their private information. This lecture studies mechanisms that are designed to raise as much revenue as possible, and characterizes the expected revenue-maximizing mechanism with respect to a prior distribution over agents’ valuations.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{roughgarden2016revenue,
  author = {Tim Roughgarden},
  title = {{Revenue-Maximizing Auctions}},
  booktitle = {Cambridge},
  year = {2016},
  doi = {10.1017/cbo9781316779309.006},
}

Loading related content...

Figure