Proxy Battles in Just War Theory

Seth Lazar, Laura ValentiniOxford 2017 · DOI · OpenAlex

Abstract

Orthodox just war theorists argue that the principles governing conduct in war—<italic>jus in bello</italic>—broadly track the current laws of armed conflict. Revisionists deny this. This chapter argues that these first-order disagreements are traceable to second-order disputes about (i) the appropriate site of principles of <italic>jus in bello</italic> and (ii) the feasibility constraints that theorizing about <italic>jus in bello</italic> should take into account. Regarding (i), orthodox theorists focus on the institutions that govern armed conflict, revisionists on individuals’ conduct. The chapter shows that, holding a given site constant, the substantive disagreement between the camps shrinks. Regarding (ii), orthodox theorists factor likely non-compliance into the design of the <italic>jus in bello</italic>, revisionists resist this move. It is argued that, relative to the site for which each is theorizing, both stances are defensible. Attention to second-order disputes in the ethics of war helps us better diagnose and adjudicate first-order ones.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{lazar2017proxy,
  author = {Seth Lazar and Laura Valentini},
  title = {{Proxy Battles in Just War Theory}},
  booktitle = {Oxford},
  year = {2017},
  doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198801221.003.0008},
}

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