Protocols for Strategic Agents: Mechanism Design

Yoav Shoham, Kevin Leyton‐BrownCambridge 2008 · DOI · OpenAlex

Abstract

As we discussed in the previous chapter, social choice theory is nonstrategic; it takes the preferences of the agents as given, and investigates ways in which they can be aggregated. But of course those preferences are usually not known. What you have, instead, is that the various agents declare their preferences, which they may do truthfully or not. Assuming the agents are self interested, in general they will not reveal their true preferences. Since as a designer you wish to find an optimal outcome with respect to the agents' true preferences (e.g., electing a leader that truly reflects the agents' preferences), optimizing with respect to the declared preferences will not in general achieve the objective.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{shoham2008protocols,
  author = {Yoav Shoham and Kevin Leyton‐Brown},
  title = {{Protocols for Strategic Agents: Mechanism Design}},
  booktitle = {Cambridge},
  year = {2008},
  doi = {10.1017/cbo9780511811654.011},
}

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