Protocols for Multiagent Resource Allocation: Auctions

Yoav Shoham, Kevin Leyton‐BrownCambridge 2008 · DOI · OpenAlex

Abstract

In this chapter we consider the problem of allocating (discrete) resources among selfish agents in a multiagent system. Auctions—an interesting and important application of mechanism design—turn out to provide a general solution to this problem. We describe various different flavors of auctions, including single-good, multiunit, and combinatorial auctions. In each case, we survey some of the key theoretical, practical, and computational insights from the literature.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{shoham2008protocols,
  author = {Yoav Shoham and Kevin Leyton‐Brown},
  title = {{Protocols for Multiagent Resource Allocation: Auctions}},
  booktitle = {Cambridge},
  year = {2008},
  doi = {10.1017/cbo9780511811654.012},
}

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