Moral Realism (1986)
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Abstract
Among contemporary philosophers, even those who have not found skepticism about empirical science at all compelling have tended to find skepticism about morality irresistible. For various reasons, among them an understandable suspicion of moral absolutism, it has been thought a mark of good sense to explain away any appearance of objectivity in moral discourse. So common has it become in secular intellectual culture to treat morality as subjective or conventional that most of us now have difficulty imagining what it might be like for there to be facts to which moral judgments answer.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{railton2003moral,
author = {Peter Railton},
title = {{Moral Realism (1986)}},
booktitle = {Cambridge},
year = {2003},
doi = {10.1017/cbo9780511613982.002},
}Loading related content...