Modeling Network Traffic Using Game Theory

David Easley, Jon KleinbergCambridge 2010 · DOI · OpenAlex

Abstract

Among the initial examples in our discussion of game theory in Chapter 6, we noted that traveling through a transportation network, or sending packets through the Internet, involves fundamentally game-theoretic reasoning: rather than simply choosing a route in isolation, individuals must evaluate routes in the presence of the congestion resulting from the decisions made by themselves and everyone else. In this chapter, we develop models for network traffic using the game-theoretic ideas developed thus far. In the process, we will discover a rather unexpected result – known as Braess's Paradox [76] – which shows that adding capacity to a network can sometimes actually slow down the traffic.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{easley2010modeling,
  author = {David Easley and Jon Kleinberg},
  title = {{Modeling Network Traffic Using Game Theory}},
  booktitle = {Cambridge},
  year = {2010},
  doi = {10.1017/cbo9780511761942.009},
}

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