Lessons from Libet

Walter Sinnott-ArmstrongOxford 2010 · DOI · OpenAlex

Abstract

Abstract The real question that Libet's experiments raise is whether our conscious wills cause the willed actions. What is at issue is the effects rather than the causes of conscious will. The question is whether conscious will is impotent, not whether it is free. If conscious will is impotent, then we cannot control our actions by means of conscious will, and this disability might reduce our freedom of action. Libet's experiments raises or sharpens this new question. By raising a new issue in a new way, Libet's work made (and continues to make) many people rethink their assumptions. The assumptions at stake are both normative and descriptive. The relevant normative assumption is, roughly, that causation by conscious will is necessary for responsibility. The descriptive assumption that Libet questions is, again roughly, that conscious will causes the willed action. This chapter addresses these assumptions in turn. It concludes that Libet's experiments do not undermine responsibility in general, but they do illuminate some particular cases as well as common standards of responsibility.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{sinnottarmstrong2010lessons,
  author = {Walter Sinnott-Armstrong},
  title = {{Lessons from Libet}},
  booktitle = {Oxford},
  year = {2010},
  doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381641.003.0020},
}

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