Kidney Exchange and Stable Matching
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Abstract
This lecture is our last on mechanism design, and it covers some of the greatest hits of mechanism design without money. Kidney exchanges, the case study covered in Section 10.1, have been deeply influenced by ideas from mechanism design over the past ten years. These exchanges enable thousands of successful kidney transplants every year. Stable matching and the remarkable deferred acceptance algorithm (Section 10.2) form the basis of modern algorithms for many assignment problems, including medical residents to hospitals and students to elementary schools. This algorithm also enjoys some beautiful mathematical properties and incentive guarantees (Section 10.3).
BibTeX
@inproceedings{roughgarden2016kidney,
author = {Tim Roughgarden},
title = {{Kidney Exchange and Stable Matching}},
booktitle = {Cambridge},
year = {2016},
doi = {10.1017/cbo9781316779309.011},
}Loading related content...