ICE: An Expressive Iterative Combinatorial Exchange

Benjamin Lubin, Adam I. Juda, Ruggiero Cavallo, Sebastien Lahaie, Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. ParkesCambridge 2017 · DOI · OpenAlex

Abstract

Combinatorial exchanges combine and generalize two different mechanisms: double auctions and combinatorial auctions. In a double auction (DA), multiple buyers and sellers trade units of an identical good (McAfee, 1992). In a combinatorial auction (CA), a single seller has multiple heterogeneous items up for sale (de Vries & Vohra, 2003; Cramton, Shoham, & Steinberg, 2006). Buyer valuations can exhibit complements (“I want A and B”) and substitutes (“I want A or B”) properties. CAs provide an expressive bidding language to describe buyer valuations. A common design goal in DAs and CAs is to implement the efficient allocation, which is the allocation that maximizes social welfare, i.e. the total value.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{lubin2017ice,
  author = {Benjamin Lubin and Adam I. Juda and Ruggiero Cavallo and Sebastien Lahaie and Jeffrey Shneidman and David C. Parkes},
  title = {{ICE: An Expressive Iterative Combinatorial Exchange}},
  booktitle = {Cambridge},
  year = {2017},
  doi = {10.1017/9781316471609.040},
}

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