Games with Sequential Actions: Reasoning and Computing with the Extensive Form
Lists
Only you see this
Abstract
In Chapter 3 we assumed that a game is represented in normal form: effectively, as a big table. In some sense, this is reasonable. The normal form is conceptually straightforward, and most see it as fundamental. While many other representations exist to describe finite games, we will see in this chapter and in Chapter 6 that each of them has an “induced normal form”: a corresponding normal-form representation that preserves game-theoretic properties such as Nash equilibria. Thus the results given in Chapter 3 hold for all finite games, no matter how they are represented; in that sense the normal-form representation is universal.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{shoham2008games,
author = {Yoav Shoham and Kevin Leyton‐Brown},
title = {{Games with Sequential Actions: Reasoning and Computing with the Extensive Form}},
booktitle = {Cambridge},
year = {2008},
doi = {10.1017/cbo9780511811654.006},
}Loading related content...