Games in extensive form

Shaheen Fatima, Sarit Kraus, Michael WooldridgeCambridge 2014 · DOI · OpenAlex

Abstract

While normal-form games capture the strategic structure of decision-making settings, they abstract away one key aspect of playing games that seems quite central to their character. Specifically, they assume that players make choices and act simultaneously, with no knowledge of the choices of their counterparts. But in many strategic situations, the players do not move simultaneously: they take turns in making their moves. An obvious example of such a situation is the game of chess. Another example is a bargaining scenario where a buyer and a seller take turns in making offers to each other in order to reach an agreement on the price of a commodity. Such situations may be modelled using sequential-moves games. In this chapter, we will study how these games are represented, and what notions of equilibria are used to analyse and solve them.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{fatima2014games,
  author = {Shaheen Fatima and Sarit Kraus and Michael Wooldridge},
  title = {{Games in extensive form}},
  booktitle = {Cambridge},
  year = {2014},
  doi = {10.1017/cbo9780511751691.006},
}

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