Facts and Values (1986)
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Abstract
The fact/value distinction, in league with such equally grand and obscure distinctions as those between objectivity and subjectivity and between reason and emotion, has been vastly influential. Yet it appears on inspection to rest upon surprisingly insecure foundations. Thus I believe we should feel a certain unease about the weight it is asked to bear when we use it to support claims of the utmost importance about the nature of knowledge and the limits of inquiry. Perhaps it is time to consider what might happen were we to stop viewing these two realms as categorically distinct. A pair of alternatives immediately suggests itself: we might soften up facts, or harden up values. I propose to follow the latter course, but only after questioning an assumption about what the hardness of facts is supposed to consist in.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{railton2003facts,
author = {Peter Railton},
title = {{Facts and Values (1986)}},
booktitle = {Cambridge},
year = {2003},
doi = {10.1017/cbo9780511613982.003},
}Loading related content...