Burning Fetch Execution: A Framework for Zero-Trust Multi-party Confidential Computing

Shahin Roozkhosh, Bassel El Mabsout, Cristiano Rodrigues, Patrick Carpanedo, Denis Hoornaert, Shurun Tan, Benjamin Lubin, Marco Caccamo, Sandro Pinto, Renato MancusoOpenalex Unknown 2025 · DOI · OpenAlex

Abstract

How can one tamper with data that does not exist? Motivated by this question, we present the Burning Fetch eXecution (BFX) paradigm. Data in-use is vulnerable, and the current focus on encrypting and/or isolating in-use data has fallen short. Frequently reported breaches of “secure” hardware and indispensable overhead with encryption schemes confirm that trust is the modern bottleneck. This work tackles the gap in existing safeguarding technology by avoiding byte-level decryption until it is immediately fetched by the processor, only to burn it right after. We perform on-the-fetch data decryption, immediately followed by burning, i.e., erasing right after processing cycles. Thus, BFX minimizes the existence of sensitive data in-use. BFX does not demand new processing hardware units nor requires restructuring application software. Three pillars set the BFX paradigm apart: (1) zero-trust multi-party confidentiality with (2) security rooted in transparency, and (3) high performance.

The Vulnerability of Data In-Use

In modern cybersecurity, protecting data at-rest (on a hard drive) and in-transit (moving over a network) is a solved problem through robust encryption. However, data in-use—the information actively being processed by a CPU—remains a critical vulnerability.

Traditional systems must decrypt data into memory to process it, creating a window of opportunity for "insider threats" (like a rogue cloud admin) or side-channel attacks. While Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) like Intel SGX aim to address this, they often suffer from hardware vulnerabilities and significant performance overhead. BFX addresses this by ensuring that plaintext data exists for only a few clock cycles, effectively shrinking the attack surface to near zero.

The Burning Fetch eXecution (BFX) Paradigm

The BFX framework rests on three technical pillars designed to eliminate the need for trust in the underlying hardware or cloud provider:

  1. Just-on-Fetch: Data remains encrypted in main memory at all times. It is decrypted at the hardware level only when the processor specifically requests a memory line, ensuring only a tiny sliver of data is ever exposed.
  2. Fetch-n-Burn: Immediately after the processor completes its cycles with the data, the BFX hardware instantly and irreversibly erases the decrypted bytes.
  3. Fetch-n-Monitor: The system tracks fetches in real-time, detecting and shutting down unauthorized access attempts by compromised operating systems or rogue processes.
The BFX framework enables zero-trust multi-party computing by protecting data and code from a compromised cloud processor, contrasting it with a naive, vulnerable approach.

By interposing a programmable module (such as an FPGA) between the processor and memory, BFX works with standard off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware without requiring software rewrites or chip redesigns.

Multi-Party Zero-Trust

BFX enables a "sharing without showing" model. In a typical scenario, a Data Owner (e.g., a drone operator) and a Code Owner (e.g., an AI developer) may need to use a third-party Data Processor (e.g., a cloud provider). BFX ensures that even if the cloud provider is compromised, the attacker cannot access the sensitive data or the proprietary code because the hardware enforcement layer prevents plaintext from persisting in memory.

Evaluation: The Drone Swarm Mission

To demonstrate BFX, the authors simulated a real-world mission involving a live, encrypted video stream from a drone swarm. A "top-secret" TensorFlow-Lite neural network was used for real-time object detection within a compromised cloud environment where an attacker had root access.

The drone swarm mission scenario used to evaluate BFX, showing the flow from data collection (1) to processing (2) and distribution (3, 4).

Key Results

  • Security against Privileged Attackers: While a "sudoer" attacker could easily dump memory and view the video feed in a standard setup, BFX rendered the memory as randomized, encrypted bytes.
  • Real-Time Performance: The system maintained real-time inference speeds on the live feed, proving that high security does not necessitate the massive performance penalties (sometimes 400x) seen in other encryption schemes.
  • Transparency: Unlike proprietary "black box" TEEs, BFX's programmable layer allows for auditability and verification by all parties involved.

Conclusion

BFX shifts the security paradigm from isolation to elimination. By ensuring that sensitive data effectively "does not exist" except during the exact cycles of computation, it provides a high-performance, zero-trust solution for the most demanding multi-party computing environments. Future work will focus on extending this protection to specialized accelerators like GPUs and scaling the architecture for data-center-class memory bandwidth.

Summary updated

Abstract

Abstract How can one tamper with data that does not exist? Motivated by this question, we present the Burning Fetch eXecution (BFX) paradigm. Data in-use is vulnerable, and the current focus on encrypting and/or isolating in-use data has fallen short. Frequently reported breaches of “secure” hardware and indispensable overhead with encryption schemes confirm that trust is the modern bottleneck. This work tackles the gap in existing safeguarding technology by avoiding byte-level decryption until it is immediately fetched by the processor, only to burn it right after. We perform on-the-fetch data decryption, immediately followed by burning , i.e., erasing right after processing cycles. Thus, BFX minimizes the existence of sensitive data in-use . BFX does not demand new processing hardware units nor requires restructuring application software. Three pillars set the BFX paradigm apart: (1) zero-trust multi-party confidentiality with (2) security rooted in transparency, and (3) high performance. By tackling the root of the issue, BFX enables a zero-trust multi-partied sharing without showing scenarios that were previously unthinkable. We showcase the impact of the BFX in a scenario with a highly privileged cloud insider attacker present. We exercise a sensitive mission whereby a third-party cloud processes fourth-party confidential real-time data streamed by a drone swarm. To further highlight the zero-trust nature of BFX , we assume the inference model (code) stream-processing on swarm data to be top-secret and owned by yet another party. The unknown threat, however, is the compromised processing system (cloud) where sensitive code and data are about to be deployed by all other parties-thanks to misplaced trust.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{roozkhosh2025burning,
  author = {Shahin Roozkhosh and Bassel El Mabsout and Cristiano Rodrigues and Patrick Carpanedo and Denis Hoornaert and Shurun Tan and Benjamin Lubin and Marco Caccamo and Sandro Pinto and Renato Mancuso},
  title = {{Burning Fetch Execution: A Framework for Zero-Trust Multi-party Confidential Computing}},
  booktitle = {Openalex Unknown},
  year = {2025},
  doi = {10.1007/978-981-95-1050-4\_24},
}

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