Bargaining and Power in Networks
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Abstract
In our analysis of economic transactions on networks, particularly the model in Chapter 11, we considered how a node's position in a network affects its power in the market. In some cases, we were able to come up with precise predictions about prices and power, but in others the analysis left open a range of possibilities. For example, in the case of perfect competition between traders, we could conclude that the traders would make no profit, but it was not possible to say whether the resulting situation would favor particular buyers or sellers – different divisions of the available surplus were possible. This is an instance of a broader phenomenon that we discussed earlier, in Chapter 6: when there are multiple equilibria, some of which favor one player and some of which favor another, we may need to look for additional sources of information to predict how things will turn out.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{easley2010bargaining,
author = {David Easley and Jon Kleinberg},
title = {{Bargaining and Power in Networks}},
booktitle = {Cambridge},
year = {2010},
doi = {10.1017/cbo9780511761942.013},
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