A Contextual Theory of Rational Retrospective Economic Voting: Strategic Voting

Raymond Duch, Randolph T. StevensonCambridge 2008 · DOI · OpenAlex

Abstract

The previous section explored the conditions under which rational voters can extract signals about incumbent competence from movements in the economy. The theory pointed to specific economic contexts that should condition the strength of the competency signal and, consequentially, the importance of the economy in the vote choice. Furthermore, our empirical analysis was largely consistent with those implications. We now propose to explore two aspects of economic voting that were not developed in the model in Chapter 5.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{duch2008contextual,
  author = {Raymond Duch and Randolph T. Stevenson and Raymond M Duch},
  title = {{A Contextual Theory of Rational Retrospective Economic Voting: Strategic Voting}},
  booktitle = {Cambridge},
  year = {2008},
  doi = {10.1017/cbo9780511755934.010},
}

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