A Contextual Theory of Rational Retrospective Economic Voting: Competency Signals

Raymond Duch, Randolph T. StevensonCambridge 2008 · DOI · OpenAlex

Abstract

Part II begins by developing a rational model of retrospective voting in which voters extract signals about the competency of incumbent politicians from movements in the retrospective economy. Given this model of individual-level economic voting, we can explore how the quality of the competency signal that voters extract from the observed economy may vary across different contexts and, hence, induce different amounts of economic voting. Chapter 5 develops a selection model of the economic vote that first describes the competency signals that voters extract from macro-economic outcomes. We then explain how the quality of these competency signals condition the economic vote. Contexts in which the quality of these competency signals are high should generate more economic voting.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{duch2008contextual,
  author = {Raymond Duch and Randolph T. Stevenson and Raymond M Duch},
  title = {{A Contextual Theory of Rational Retrospective Economic Voting: Competency Signals}},
  booktitle = {Cambridge},
  year = {2008},
  doi = {10.1017/cbo9780511755934.006},
}

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