16. Maverick: Experimentally Testing a Conjecture of the Antitrust Authorities

Christoph Engel, Axel OckenfelsOpenalex Unknown 2020 · DOI · OpenAlex

Abstract

Antitrust authorities worldwide prioritize the presence of "maverick" firms—competitors that act with unusual aggression to disrupt market coordination. Despite their prominence in regulatory guidelines, these firms lack a robust theoretical justification within standard economic models. This study investigates a behavioral determinant for maverick behavior: the possibility that certain market actors derive utility from acting competitively. By classifying participants through social value orientation (SVO) and observing their behavior in a laboratory oligopoly, we demonstrate that individuals with rivalistic attitudes bid more aggressively, effectively disciplining incumbents and increasing consumer welfare. These findings provide empirical support for antitrust policies that specifically protect maverick firms.

Introduction

In antitrust law, a "maverick" is defined as a firm that plays a disproportionate role in maintaining market competition by resisting the urge to collude or follow price leaders. While both US and EU merger guidelines explicitly mention the importance of protecting these entities, standard economic theory often struggles to explain their existence. If all firms are rational, profit-maximizing entities with similar cost structures, the emergence of an "unusually disruptive" player is an anomaly.

This paper proposes that maverick behavior is rooted in the behavioral traits of decision-makers. Specifically, we hypothesize that some individuals possess a "rivalistic" social value orientation (SVO), meaning they derive utility not just from absolute profit, but from the difference between their payoff and that of their competitors. This "desire to win" acts as a structural market force that can prevent tacit collusion.

Experimental Methodology

To test this conjecture, the researchers conducted a two-stage laboratory experiment at the Bonn EconLab involving 88 participants.

Stage 1: Social Value Orientation (SVO) Classification

Participants first completed a "Ring Measure" task, making 32 choices regarding money allocations between themselves and an anonymous partner. This allowed researchers to calculate a "ring degree" and categorize subjects into three distinct groups:

  • Rivalistic (Negative SVO): Individuals willing to sacrifice their own absolute profit to maximize the gap between themselves and others.
  • Selfish (Zero SVO): Individuals who focus exclusively on their own absolute payoff.
  • Prosocial/Inequity Averse (Positive SVO): Individuals who prefer equal distributions or maximizing collective payoffs.

Stage 2: The Cournot Market

The main experiment utilized a Cournot (quantity competition) market model across 20 rounds:

  1. Phase 1 (Rounds 1-10): Two "incumbents" operated in a duopoly, often establishing a "cozy" or collusive market environment.
  2. Phase 2 (Rounds 11-20): A third player, the "entrant," was introduced. Crucially, the researchers selected entrants based on their SVO scores from Stage 1, creating three treatment groups (Negative, Zero, and Positive SVO entrants).

Key Insights and Results

The Disciplining Effect of Rivalry

The experiment confirmed that personality traits are a reliable predictor of market outcomes. Participants classified as rivalistic in the allocation task consistently bid more aggressively in the oligopoly market. The entry of a maverick does more than just add supply; it "disciplines" the incumbents. When a rivalistic entrant appears, incumbents are forced to reduce their own quantities to maintain any level of profit, effectively shattering the previous collusive equilibrium.

Impact on Consumer Welfare

The presence of a maverick significantly benefits consumers. In markets where a rivalistic firm entered a previously collusive environment, total market quantity increased substantially. Quantitatively, the model predicts that in a perfectly collusive market, total quantity is 3.75 units higher when a rivalistic firm enters compared to the entry of a prosocial firm.

The Role of Market History

The study also found a significant "history effect." The average quantity produced in the first 10 rounds was a strong predictor of behavior in the second phase. For every 1-unit increase in pre-entry quantity, post-entry quantity increased by approximately 0.414 units, suggesting that while personality drives aggression, the existing market context still informs the magnitude of that aggression.

Discussion and Policy Implications

These results suggest that the "desire to win" is a stable personality trait that can be treated as a structural variable in economic models, similar to cost or capacity. Maverick behavior is most impactful as a "cure" for tacit collusion; if a market is already fiercely competitive, the addition of a rivalistic entrant has a negligible effect.

Limitations

While the laboratory setting provides clear evidence of the behavioral link, the authors acknowledge the "wedge" between student subjects and professional corporate managers. Corporate decision-making is often an aggregate process that may dampen individual traits. Furthermore, the sustainability of rivalistic behavior over long horizons—where the pressure to maximize shareholder returns might eventually override the utility of winning—remains an open question for future research.

Conclusion

By providing experimental evidence that rivalistic attitudes lead to more aggressive market behavior and higher consumer welfare, this study justifies the focus of antitrust authorities on maverick firms. Protecting these disruptive players is not just a matter of preserving a specific competitor, but of preserving the behavioral diversity necessary to prevent market stagnation and collusion.

Summary updated

Abstract

Antitrust authorities all over the world are keen on the presence of a particularly aggressive competitor, a "maverick". Yet there is a lack of theoretical justification. One plausible determinant of acting as a maverick is behavioral: the maverick derives utility from acting competitively. We test this conjecture in the lab. In a pretest, we classify participants by their social value orientation. Individuals who are rivalistic in an allocation task indeed bid more aggressively in a laboratory oligopoly market. This disciplines incumbents. We conclude that the existence of rivalistic attitudes may justify antitrust policies that protect mavericks.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{engel2020maverick,
  author = {Christoph Engel and Axel Ockenfels},
  title = {{16. Maverick: Experimentally Testing a Conjecture of the Antitrust Authorities}},
  booktitle = {Openalex Unknown},
  year = {2020},
  doi = {10.1515/9783110647495-016},
}
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