Span-Level Detection of Fabricated Lived Experience Across Platforms

Chatbots that offer emotional support sometimes claim experiences they cannot have: "Same here, my second trimester was rough too," or "I lost my dad last year, so I know how this feels." These claims work. People reciprocate when a bot discloses first, and they rate warm language models as more empathic than trained humans. That is exactly why such claims are an ethical problem in counseling, elder care, and health forums. The detectors meant to catch this behavior have only been trained and tested within a single Chinese counseling corpus, on random splits. Nobody knows whether they recognize the claim itself or whether they have learned the surface habits of one platform.

We propose to treat fabricated lived experience the way radiology treated hospital-token shortcuts. We will label the exact phrase that asserts a first-person bodily, biographical, or relational experience, rather than labeling a whole reply as unsafe. We will then test detectors only on platforms, languages, and generating models they never saw during training. The bet is that phrase-level supervision transfers across platforms where reply-level supervision does not, and that the external test protocol will reveal how much of today's reported accuracy is shortcut. We also expect the protocol to settle whether a prompted frontier model already makes trained detectors unnecessary.

Core Claim

The construct has an unusual property: whether a disclosure is deceptive depends on who says it, not only on what the text says. A human supporter's "I went through a divorce too" is a legitimate helping skill. Towards Emotional Support Dialog Systems annotates exactly this as a positive "Self-disclosure" strategy in ESConv. The identical sentence from a bot is the Humanoid Mimicry violation defined in A Benchmark for Understanding Dialogue Safety in Mental Health Support.

Reply-level labels fold two things together: the text-level fact that "an experience claim is present," and the deployment-level fact that "the speaker is a machine." That folding invites a detector to learn anything correlated with machine-ness on the training platform. Examples include length, formality, emoji use, and topic. Large Language Models Produce Responses Perceived to be Empathic showed that these stylistic fingerprints are easy to learn; logistic regression identifies the generating model at F1 0.86 to 0.96.

We claim that supervising the claim span alone, with speaker identity handled as separate metadata, yields detectors with a much smaller gap between internal and external performance. We will measure that gap under leave-one-source-out evaluation.

Prior Work and Its Roles

Three papers motivate the gap. A Benchmark for Understanding Dialogue Safety in Mental Health Support defines the eight-class taxonomy that contains Humanoid Mimicry. It reports 70.3% (BERT-base) and 70.4% (RoBERTa-large) accuracy on internal splits. It labels whole responses, uses only Chinese sources, and performs no external test. Our work keeps its definition but changes both the label granularity and the evaluation protocol. CASS documents the "Same here" problem in a live pregnancy forum but builds no detector. An Empirical Study of Self-Disclosure in Spoken Dialogue Systems shows reciprocity is real: users disclosed in 56.5% of conversations versus 35.5% in the control. Its self-disclosure classifier (F1 66.67%) was never validated outside the Alexa Prize platform.

Two papers constrain the design. UNIDECOR pooled 14 English deception corpora and found that cross-corpus F1 collapses across genres. It also found that classic lexical cues such as first-person "I" rates do not hold consistently. This rules out building our detector on lexicon features, and it warns that "deception" may not be a single transferable construct. Our response is to narrow the target to a semantically concrete claim type rather than intent to deceive. A Critical Reflection and Forward Perspective on Empathy and Natural Language Processing found that 37.5% of empathy papers offer no proper definition. This pushes us to write an explicit, testable annotation guideline.

Two papers supply methods. Rethinking Annotation Granularity for Overcoming Shortcuts showed that lesion-level boxes, unlike image-level labels, kept chest-radiograph models accurate on external hospitals. It also showed that adding more coarsely labeled data could hurt external performance. We transfer both the hypothesis and the "more data" control to text. Enhancing Compositional Generalization via Compositional Feature Alignment separates class and domain features using orthogonal linear heads and was tested only on vision models. We use it as the main competing route to robustness, not as our method.

Research Program

The first deliverable is a multi-source evaluation set for fabricated experience claims, with span annotations. It will draw on six sources. The first is DialogueSafety responses already labeled Humanoid Mimicry, which we re-annotate at span level. The second is supporter turns in ESConv tagged as Self-disclosure; these are human and truthful, but they have the text form of the claim. The third is responses we generate with GPT-4-class, Llama-family, and Mistral-family models to the Reddit distress posts used by Lee et al. The fourth is generated replies to seeker turns from AnnoMI and Cactus, which are the corpora Dialogue Systems for Emotional Support via Value Reinforcement used for its own cross-dataset generalization. The fifth is r/offmychest human replies from that same paper. The sixth is CASS-style forum replies where they are available.

Each response receives three kinds of mark. Experience-claim spans cover somatic, biographical, relational, or emotional-history assertions made in the first person. Performative-empathy spans, such as "that sounds exhausting," mark legitimate reflection that must not be flagged. Speaker identity is recorded separately as metadata. From the span labels we derive reply-level labels mechanically, which gives coarse and fine supervision over identical texts and an identical annotation budget.

The second deliverable is the detector comparison under strict external validation. Detectors train on one or more sources and are tested on sources never seen in training. No normalization statistics or thresholds are tuned on the test source. Thresholds are fixed on a validation split of the training sources only, which avoids the pooled-split trap. Within-source random-split scores are reported alongside, so the internal-versus-external gap is visible for every method.

The third deliverable is a shortcut audit. We test whether each detector's decisions follow the claim span or follow style. Attribution mass on the gold span is one measure. A counterfactual test is the other: an experience claim is kept verbatim while the rest of the reply is rewritten in another model's style, and we check whether the prediction flips.

Baselines

The naive reference is a rule detector. It flags first-person pronouns that co-occur within a clause with past-tense experiential verbs or kinship and body terms. It also includes a prior-only classifier that predicts the training-source majority class. If the learned detectors do not clearly beat the rule on external sources, the problem is easier than the literature implies, and that is itself worth reporting.

The strongest existing trained method is a fine-tuned encoder with reply-level labels, following DialogueSafety. Qiu et al. report 70.3% accuracy (BERT-base) and 70.4% (RoBERTa-large) on the 8-class internal test. No reported result found on Lacuna for per-class Humanoid Mimicry F1 or for any external evaluation of these models. We will reproduce the internal number first as a sanity check. Then we will train multilingual versions on the same backbone, data, and hyperparameter search budget as our span model. Beating it means a higher macro-F1 on held-out sources and a smaller internal-external gap, with confidence intervals from source-level bootstrap.

The strongest untrained competitor is a prompted large language model given the written Humanoid Mimicry definition and few-shot examples. Qiu et al. report ChatGPT at 43.1–47.5% zero-shot and 44.7–48.4% 8-shot accuracy on the 8-class task. Those numbers come from an older model on a harder multi-class task, so we will run a current frontier model on the same binary claim task, with the same guideline text annotators receive. We will report both its accuracy and its false-positive rate on performative-empathy spans, since Qiu et al. observed over-flagging.

The representational competitor is Compositional Feature Alignment adapted to text. It uses the same encoder, the reply-level class head, and a source-identity domain head under the orthogonality constraint, followed by the two-stage training from Wang et al.

The key ablation trains identical encoders on identical texts with span labels versus span-derived reply labels. This isolates granularity from data. A second ablation adds the remaining DialogueSafety coarse data to the reply-level model, testing whether more coarse data helps or, as Luo et al. found in radiographs, hurts on external sources.

Why not just…?

Why not just prompt a frontier model with the definition? This is the real threat. Fabricated experience is a semantically legible concept, and the 43–48% figures from Qiu et al. reflect GPT-3.5 on an eight-way task, not a current model on a binary one. If a prompted model matches the span-trained detector on external sources, we will report that the trained-detector route is unnecessary for this violation. The contribution would then shift to the external benchmark and to measuring the prompted model's over-flagging of legitimate empathy. We also report cost and latency, since detection must run on every turn in deployment, and a small detector that matches the frontier model externally would still matter.

Why not just pool all corpora and train one detector? Pooling exposes the model to every platform's signature during training, so random-split scores stop measuring transfer. Luo et al. found that adding coarsely labeled data degraded some external results. Our leave-one-source-out arm trains the pooled model on all but one source and tests on the held-out one. If pooled reply-level training closes the gap without span labels, granularity is not the operative ingredient, and we will say so.

Why not just disentangle style from class geometrically with CFA, without new annotation? CFA needs a domain label, and here the troublesome "domain" is partly speaker identity, which is entangled with the class itself. We expect orthogonality to remove platform style but not the machine-speaker correlation. This is an empirical question, and the head-to-head comparison at matched compute answers it. Span supervision and CFA can also be combined, and we test the combination.

Why not just use lexicons like LIWC? UNIDECOR already found inconsistent cross-corpus correlations for exactly these features, including first-person pronoun rates. The rule baseline covers this alternative cheaply.

Proposed Experiments

The decisive check is the leave-one-source-out matrix. For each held-out source, we compare the span-trained and reply-trained detectors on macro-F1 for claim presence and on false-positive rate for performative-empathy spans. The hypothesis is supported if the span model's external macro-F1 exceeds the reply model's on a majority of held-out sources while internal scores stay similar. That pattern mirrors the CheXDet-versus-CheXNet result. A within-source tie combined with an external gap is the signature we expect.

The second check is cross-lingual: train on Chinese DialogueSafety and test on English sources, and the reverse. This directly addresses the external-validation limitation that Qiu et al. acknowledge.

The third check is the style-swap counterfactual. A detector that relies on the claim should keep its prediction when GPT-4-style framing replaces Llama-style framing around a fixed claim. A shortcut detector will flip, and the flip rate is our shortcut metric.

The fourth check is the ESConv speaker test. Truthful human self-disclosures should be detected as claims at the same rate as machine fabrications. Reply-level detectors trained on DialogueSafety should miss them, which would show they learned machine-ness rather than the claim.

The fifth check uses the same protocol at matched compute and tuning budget to decide whether the prompted frontier model or CFA makes the annotation effort unnecessary.